Introduction and context: the difficulty of building an integrationist project after a devastating war
After 1945, Europe was deeply divided, destroyed and unstable, and coal and steel were key resources as they were the backbone of military power. Control over these industries had been a major conflict in both world wars and the Western allies believed something had to be done to prevent another war.
In this context, the French government hosted a conference along 5 other European states, resulting in the Treaty of Paris of 1951, by which the European Coal and Steel Community was created with the goal of integrating the aforementioned resources in a single common market to prevent another war and promote trade. Though, in the text itself only the economic face of this goal was mentioned and, as we will see, the focus of the treaty was in many points looking at economic growth more than citizens in this first phase of integration, as per art. 2 of the Treaty:
Article 2 of the Treaty of Paris (1951) establishing the ECSC
The European Coal and Steel Community shall have as its task to contribute, in harmony with the general economy of the Member States and through the establishment of a common market as provided in Article 4, to economic expansion, growth of employment and rising standard of living in the Member States.
With no specific mention neither in this nor in article 3 (about the interests the institutions of the Community must follow and work towards) of the prevention of war, even though it’s a central key concept to its whole existence, as it was born from the post-WWII era and the fear of what shortly came to be known as the Cold War era. Thus, both the memory of the recent war and the menace that implied the configuration of the Eastern bloc as a community of coordinated puppeted governments by the USSR played a tacit but undeniable role in its formation. This treaty is the object of our study, which we analysed from both a material and formal perspectives: from its drafting to its content.
Let’s start with the historical view. The ECSC served as a precedent for the posterior European communities, paving the way for integration; however, the path towards this goal was far from being easy nor unanimously supported, during the drafting of this treaty two interesting cases of opposition to the project —both heavily influenced by the recent war climate— rose:
The case of the U.K.
The United Kingdom’s case is one of special interest, during a first period, it was a founding member of both the Council of Europe and NATO, with Churchill making vibrant declarations in favour of a United States of Europe, hosting a conference in The Hague in 1948 with several pro-European movements, and advocating for integration against the new menace behind what he called in his Fulton Speech of 1946 the iron curtain. This initially drove the U.K. through an alignment momentum with its European peers.
Nonetheless, this first movement came to an end, and prime minister Clement Attlee’s cabinet suddenly started being reluctant of integration, due to two main reasons:
- The U.K. was by that moment the first producer of coal and steel in Europe and they perceived the ECSC as a menace to their resources and economy.
- And also they had a problem with the composition and accountability of the High Authority, with Attlee saying that he ‘would not accept the economy being handed over to an authority that is utterly undemocratic and is responsible to nobody’.
The negotiations continued without the British government attending the conference, marking the start of what politologists call the Awkward Partner Theory, that explains the issues of British integration in Europe.
The French case
Opposition to the ECSC also happened across the English channel, with the proposal facing strong opposition in France itself -the host country. De Gaulle, who had historically been an integrationist and even advocated for a confederation, argued that the ECSC was a false pooling with an undemocratic basement as it wasn’t ratified by a European referendum and, thus, voted against the treaty in the national assembly.
But he was just the political face of a widespread sentiment across the Héxagone: a fear of giving away sovereignty. This fear is best understood from two key points:
- The first is the fact that France lost its sovereignty during the war, and the scars were still not healed at all. Proof of this is the refusal in 1954 of the European Defense Community by the National Assembly.
- And the second is the economic consequences of the ECSC, as it meant a possible crisis of the Lorraine heavy industries, which was a common worry among steelworkers.
The Community shall carry out its task in accordance with this Treaty, with a limited measure of intervention. [...] The institutions of the Community shall carry out these activities with a minimum of administrative machinery and in close cooperation with the parties concerned.
The Founding Fathers: Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet
Once these issues with public opinion and opposition were solved —or, at least in the British case, determined the exclusion—, the conference was set to go and negotiations started, with some politicians and thinkers taking main positions in the talks. On May 9th, 1950, the integration process started with the Schuman Declaration. They shared a vision that was influenced by their life's experiences, they both saw the end of 19th century empires, lived through World War I, the financial crisis of 1929, the rise of totalitarian regimes and the destruction of World War II that we commented upon.
Jean Monnet (1888-1979)
Jean Monnet was a French economist and public official born in 1888 and was known for being the architect of the ECSC. He started making efforts to unite Europe during the First World War and during World War II, Monnet continued working on cooperation between France and Britain, designing the ‘Joint Communique’, a proposed federal union between the two nations. By 1949, Monnet raised concern about the rising tensions between France and Germany over the control of the Ruhr coal and steel region. He realised that if control of these resources was placed under one high authority another conflict would become materially impossible. Monnet drafted and prepared the Schuman Declaration and his philosophy was built on ‘legitimacy through outcomes’; he believed that achievements like peace and prosperity would secure the community’s future. He later served as the first president of the High Authority of the ECSC (1952).
Robert Schumann (1886-1963)
While Monnet was the architect, Robert Schuman was the political driver of the project. Born a German citizen in Luxembourg and later becoming a French citizen, Schuman’s background embodied the multicultural environment of Europe. Schuman studied law in Germany and his vision was deeply spiritual, influenced by Catholic Social Teaching. For Schuman, the European Community was not just a geographic area but a European spirit based on common cultural heritage and mutual understanding. He believed that the community must be democratic, pluralistic and based on the dignity of every person.
At the start of World War Two, Schuman was a junior minister in the French Government and during the war he became a member of the French Resistance. After the war he went back to national politics and continued to advocate for a united Europe, taking the immense political risk of accepting Monnet’s plan for the ECSC, making the motion for the Schuman Declaration public on May 9, 1950, a date we now celebrate as Europe Day. He subsequently became president of the European Parliamentary Assembly in 1958 and was granted the title ‘Father of Europe’.
The institutions: the ECSC’s inner structure
This design reflected the vision that was articulated in the Schuman Declaration. The Treaty of Paris established four key bodies in its article 7: the High Authority, the Council of Ministers, the Court of Justice and the Common Assembly. These bodies needed to work together to make another war ‘not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’ (Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1950).
Article 7 of the Treaty of Paris (1951) establishing the ECSC:
The institutions of the Community shall be: a High Authority, assisted by a Consultative Committee; a Common Assembly (hereinafter called the “Assembly”); a Special Council of Ministers (hereinafter called the “Council”); a Court of Justice (hereinafter called the “Court”).
The central institution of the ECSC was the High Authority, which, as stated, was proposed by Jean Monnet; as a matter of fact, this institution is regulated in the first chapter of the second title, with as much as twelve articles (twice the amount that the Assembly chapter has, and more than twice of the Council’s chapter, only second to the Court’s extension). The High Authority was the executive body, acting as a major innovation in European governance. Usually, traditional intergovernmental organisations were not independent from national governments, but the High Authority was. France and West Germany had previously dominated this sector, but this removed direct national control over coal and steel production. This was because the High Authority prevented unilateral decision making. It regulated production levels, pricing and promoted fair competition. Its decisions were legally binding, ensuring compliance and uniformity across the Community.
Although, it did not operate unchecked. The Council of Ministers (Chapter III of Title Two) was created to represent national governments and ensure that supranational decisions remained compatible with domestic economic policies. This created a crucial forum for dialogue between member states. This balanced national interests with collective governance, so that the Council played a key role in maintaining political stability and preventing the re-emergence of any tensions. This basic principle is expressed through the notion harmonise in the treaty, which conveys and sums up really well the intention behind its existence:
Article 26 of the Treaty of Paris (1951) establishing the ECSC:
The Council shall exercise its powers in the cases provided for and in the manner set out in this Treaty, in particular in order to harmonise the action of the High Authority and that of the Governments, which are responsible for the general economic policies of their countries.
Next, legal oversight was provided by the Court of Justice (Chapter IV of Title Two), ensuring that all actions taken under the Treaty of Paris were adhering to the rule of law; this is, its task being the interpretation and application of the treaty and secondary rules born from it (as per article 31). It contained independent judges appointed by member states and the Court reviewed the legality of decisions made by the High Authority. This institution was fundamental in embedding legal accountability within the ECSC framework. This was a contrast to previous militarised conflict resolution that had occurred previously. Disputes could now be addressed through judicial processes, reinforcing long term peace. Though this institution was severely limited by the refusal of giving away sovereignty that the states had, with a special provision in article 37 allowing for member states to raise the matter of judgement of the Court to the High Authority under the belief that it may provoke a disturbance in its national economy:
Article 37 of the Treaty of Paris (1951) establishing the ECSC:
If a Member State considers that in a given case action or failure to act on the part of the High Authority is of such a nature as to provoke fundamental and persistent disturbances in its economy, it may raise the matter with the High Authority.
Fourthly, there was the Common Assembly (Chapter II of Title Two), introducing an element of democratic accountability. It comprised of representatives from national parliaments and it was responsible for further supervising the High Authority’s activities. It scrutinised decisions and represented the citizens’ interests, emphasising transparency and legitimacy within the system. Over time, this body evolved into the European Parliament, demonstrating the lasting significance of the ECSC’s institutional design. Nonetheless, an interesting fact about this democratic chamber is its election method, as after the amendment of 1957 to the treaty of the ECSC there was a clause in article 21 that suggested the implementation of a direct election via universal suffrage with a uniform procedure in all member states instead of an indirect one determined by the parliaments of the member states
Article 21.3 of the Treaty of Paris (1951) establishing the ECSC:
The Assembly shall draw up proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States.
But this clause never was fully implemented, and the Assembly was elected by parliaments and not through direct elections. It wasn’t until 1979 that the first European elections were held, to appoint 410 MEPs to the European Parliament across all 9 European Community member states. This shows the difficulties that the ECSC faced, with strong reluctance to provide a real democratic space of cooperation, with the focus rather being the economy and a strong bloc against the new menace to the East.
This all comes to show that after WWII, European leaders —among which, as we showed, the founding fathers took a main role— recognised the need for caution, stability and cooperation in rebuilding the continent. The careful construction of the ECSCs framework reflects this priority, with a focus on its economic and structural functionality to face a strong Cold War era in which robust integrationist institutions provided security; this all came at a cost: democracy and citizens’ rights weren’t at the center of the Treaty, as we’ve seen, and only came to be a priority with further amendments and treaties. Regarding the institutions’ coordination, by distributing power across multiple bodies —each with distinct yet independent roles— the Community ensured that no single authority could dominate. As Alan Milward argued in ‘The European Rescue of the Nation-State’, national sovereignty was not undermined by the ECSC, but instead it was saved by enabling governments to achieve political and economic stability. This intricate system laid the foundation for a durable peace based on cooperation, accountability and the rule of law.
Supranationalism and economic integration: the ECSC significance
Moving on from its structure and character, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) cannot be reduced to a mere sectoral agreement; it represents an epistemological break with the Westphalian model that had dominated Europe since 1648. The previous system was progressively undermined by the rise of a new concept: supranationalism, an organizational model that challenges the dogma of absolute, indivisible sovereignty and the state as the sole holder of power. Unlike previous organizations such as the UN https or NATO, still anchored in an intergovernmental logic of coordination between sovereign entities, the ECSC inaugurated the shared exercise of sovereignty in strategic functional areas, such as the coal and steel sectors, prefiguring the modern concept of multilevel governance.
From a constitutional perspective, the ECSC was undergoing a threefold theoretical transformation:
First, it redefines sovereignty no longer as absolute domination, but as allocable competence. This "functionalization" allows decision-making powers to be transferred to a higher level without the state disappearing, anticipating the doctrine of attributed powers typical of the current European Union (articles 8 and 14 of the ECSC). In particular, art. 14 granted the High Authority the power to adopt decisions that were directly binding on member states and enterprises, marking a clear departure from traditional international law, where implementation depended on national authorities.
Second, it promotes the legalization of conflict: law precedes and structures politics. If historically strategic tensions were resolved through balance of power or force, the ECSC imposes pre-established legal procedures and binding decisions adopted by a shared authority, ensuring compliance with the principle of legality (art. 33 ECSC, in relation to the Court). More specifically, Article 33 enabled judicial review of the legality of the High Authority's acts, reinforcing the idea that supranational powers were constrained within a legal framework rather than political discretion. Peace, therefore, ceases to be a fragile military balance, becoming a systemic condition guaranteed by the legal system.
Finally, the ECSC "depoliticizes" the coal and steel sectors: it removes them from national competition and war symbolism, making them the subject of common technical and administrative management. This reflected the strategic vision that Monnet and Schuman promoted to defend the shared control over these resources so as to neutralize their war-making potential.
However, such an interpretation risks overlooking the broader geopolitical context in which the ECSC emerged. The Community was also shaped by the early Cold War environment: it functioned as a strategic instrument to anchor West Germany within the Western bloc and to stabilize a politically fragile Europe, also under the influence of American economic support. This perspective challenges a purely idealistic reading of European integration, highlighting its connection to power politics and security concerns.
The impact on the concept of the State is equally profound. Supranational integration implies that states accept binding decisions even if they are contrary to their individual will. This is not a “loss” of sovereignty —as the British government and the French opposition feared—, but rather a voluntary and reciprocal limitation of its exercise, based on consensus and aimed at achieving a greater good: systemic stability. Moreover, the functionalist approach underlying the ECSC tended to equate economic integration with political progress. In the post-war context, economic growth was often seen as a sufficient condition for democratic development, resulting in a limited emphasis on direct democratic participation and anticipating what would later be defined as a "democratic deficit."
Within this framework, the ECSC's peace strategy stands out clearly from military deterrence. While NATO pursues “negative” peace (absence of war through preparation for conflict), the ECSC embodies the functionalist intuition of so-called “peace engineering”. Through the creation of a de facto solidarity —as Schuman expressed in his declaration— and deep economic interdependence, the war conflict becomes materially irrational and technically impracticable. Integration into one sector generates such pressure that it allows expansion into other areas (spillover effect), transforming economic cooperation into political trust.
This explains why the ECSC placed a strong emphasis on economic integration, while later treaties such as Maastricht or Lisbon expanded cooperation to include not only markets but also citizenship, fundamental rights, and the rule of law. Nevertheless, this evolution also reflects a persistent tension between market-oriented integration and the construction of a fully democratic political community.
Conclusion
This all comes to say that the ECSC, born from the devastating events of World War II, faced strong difficulties from the start —as we saw with the British or the French oppositors—, as European integration has been an object of debate for many time, and its organic —and, to a lesser extent, dogmatic— innovations were impactful on the continent.
But eventually, the founding fathers were able to reach a compromise and guide —through their expertise and experience— the negotiations to a satisfactory ending: the Treaty of Paris; in which a complex and robust structure of many new institutions was laid in such a good way that even today some of the main institutions of the EU are just the natural evolution of those designed by the founding fathers of the ECSC, only with their focus maturing from a mere economic collaboration to a space of coexistence between cultures and citizens with a series of shared fundamental rights and democratic values.
And thus, the ECSC was the theoretical and institutional laboratory that transformed the international order from anarchist to partially hierarchical and binding. Its most radical legacy lies in having demonstrated that integration is a tool for the systemic transformation of relations between states. It did not simply end a conflict, but neutralized war by making it impracticable among its members, who understood that a better quality of life and economic wellbeing came from cooperation, ushering in a European order in which peace no longer depends on balancing forces, but on transforming the rules of the political and legal game.
However, this interpretation should be balanced with the awareness that the integration process also reflected the priorities and limits of its time, particularly the emphasis on economic growth and the relatively limited role initially assigned to democratic participation. These tensions would later emerge more clearly in the evolution of the European Union.
As Jean Monnet famously said,
Continue, continue, there is no future for the people of Europe other than in union
(source: European Union)
Eduardo Cornudella, Isabelle Hannam, Matilde Gremmo & Ellie Cullen
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