WARWICK CASE: The ‘Risorgimento’ as a fragmented paradigm - was Italy, by 1871, any more than a ‘mere geographical expression’?
Often dismissed within the romanticised narrative describing the Italian Risorgimento is a famous remark made by Prince Klemens von Metternich (1773-1859) in 1847. The Austrian statesman described the territories of Italy as a ‘mere geographical expression’ to suggest it was politically, socially and culturally fragmented. Whilst historians have written extensively on the heroic, patriotic nature of the Italian struggle for national unification, ongoing structural inequalities and cultural differences lend weight towards Metternich’s claim.
Terminology used to justify the legal unification of Italy acted as a facade for the internal divisions within the newly established nation state. This sentiment was even hinted at by key political figures across the ideological spectrum. Where the Risorgimento is unfortunately a movement dominated by ‘great’ men, some appear to resonate with the lives of ordinary Italians more than others. A comparative analysis of passages spoken by Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882), Camillo Benso Count Cavour (1810-1861) and King of Italy Victor Emmanuel II (1820-1878) when unification finally seemed possible reveals how glorifying the term Risorgimento can be problematic.
Giuseppe Garibaldi ‘The Revolutionary’: Proclamation of 1860.
Source: Alexandre Dumas, ed., The Memoirs of Garibaldi (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1931), p. 359.
Adapting the nationalist sentiment of Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872), Garibaldi had previously been a figurehead in preserving the Roman Republic of 1849 which eventually fell at the hands of the French. This struggle reflected a revolutionary desire to seize power by popular support against the conservative restored order and dominant institutions like the Papacy. In essence, Garibaldi equated nationalism with a liberated struggle which included the support of the Italian people.
In 1860, Garibaldi embarked on an expedition to Sicily with a group of ordinary Italians labelled ‘The Thousand’. He remarkably led and trained a small force of inexperienced soldiers to defeat a repressive Bourbon house on the island by capitalising on socio-economic problems like famine. His proclamation in 1860 features terminology that highlights a desire for nationalist change without referring to Italy as a singular legal entity.
‘If we abandon these brave children of Sicily and leave them to their fate, they will have to fight against the mercenaries of the Bourbon, plus those of Austria and those of the priest who reigns in Rome.’
Describing the insurgents as 'brave children' suggests two important things. Firstly, those who have embraced his revolutionary nationalism are young - this does suggest that the older generation of ordinary Italians are disconnected. Secondly, comparing his army to children suggests a lack of ideological understanding and how, even by 1860, unification remained a new concept to many. The mention of imperialist Austria and the Church highlights how there were significant problems both externally and domestically within Italy. With this appeal Garibaldi continues to address solely the 'Marches, and Umbria, and Sabina, and the Roman Campania, and the land of Naples' as a united force against conservative repression. These Southern territories, with a lack of economic development and low literacy rates, differ massively from the towns within Northern provinces like Lombardy, Piedmont and Venezia. This distinct separation underlines a North-South divide in a nation supposedly on the path towards unification.
‘“Italy and Victor Emmanuel!” This, our battlecry when crossing the Ticino, will echo to the fiery rocks of [AE]tna.’
Placing Victor Emmanuel at the head of the struggle slightly contradicts the revolutionary nature of Garibaldi’s men supposedly representing the people. The chant of ‘Italy and Victor Emmanuel’ shows that abrupt change was never a realistic outcome for the Italian people. Instead, a slower process of constitutional governance over republicanism was to be favoured. Were the failures of the Roman Republic continuing to plague the mind of Garibaldi?
Count Cavour ‘The Pragmatist’: Speech to the Piedmont Chamber of Deputies, 1858.
Source: The Annual Register or a View of the History and Politics of the Year 1858 (London, 1859), pp. 186-188.
It can be argued that what Garibaldi was for the South, Cavour was to the North. A man of political wit and economic vision, the Piedmontese based Cavour led the industrial expansion of Northern Italy and was the first Italian representative to attend diplomatic congresses with other European powers. His decision to send Italian troops into the Crimean War ensured he held a seat at the resulting Congress of Paris in 1856 however his demands to expel Austria from Northern Italy were ignored. For Cavour, a United Kingdom of Italy would ideally be led by the state of Piedmont. His political outlook certainly contrasts with Garibaldi’s opportunistic republicanism.
Addressing the Chamber of Piedmont after the outcomes of the Crimean War, Cavour appears rather positive despite Italy gaining very little from the diplomatic summit. Described by many as a ‘Realist’, Cavour has an intrinsic relationship with legal obligations. He states within the same speech a ‘firm intention to respect treaties’ signed between Piedmont and other nations. This sensible and pragmatic approach to unification directly contrasts with the erratic burst of patriotism ignited by Garibaldi in the South. It was Cavour after all who ensured legal unification was completed by issuing a series of plebiscites to the other Italian states. The options on the voting card overwhelmingly favoured the Kingdom of Piedmont and therefore the socially inferior South had to accept these terms which were completely unfamiliar to them. Furthermore, with the Austro-Prussian War ceding Venezia to Piedmont and Rome falling after the French departed to fight Prussia in 1870, Italy in reality unified their territories by default rather than as a result of a romantic struggle.
In recent years, therefore, we have tried to do away with the last hindrances to our country, and we have lost no occasion to act as the spokesman and defender of the other peoples of Italy. This policy found one such occasion in the Crimean War. . . .Our hopes were not disappointed in regard to the credit that Piedmont would acquire. As for the defence of the rights of Italy, that was our task in the course of the Congress of Paris. . . . it was an outstanding fact that the cause of Italy was for the first time supported by an Italian power.
Note Cavour’s closely linked references to Piedmont and Italy. The state of Piedmont was believed to act as the ‘spokesman and defender’ of Italy despite its differences to the other states across the country. This speech also showcases how Italy has grappled with the concepts of Western modernity and national identity. The ‘defence of the rights of Italy’ (Piedmont) is a phrase used by Cavour which mirrors the sentiment of other democratically justified countries, like the United States and France, in the years prior. The only difference being - was Italy really a democratically represented nation? Nevertheless, Piedmont certainly was!
Victor Emmanuel II ‘The Figurehead’: Speech of Vittorio Emmanuel I, King of Italy, 1861.
Source: Count C. Arrivabene, Italy under Victor Emmanuel (London, 1862), I: 349-353.
In a symbolic attempt to justify the legal unification of Italy in 1861, Victor Emmanuel II changed his title to Victor Emmanuel I, which signified his position as the first leader within the newly united Kingdom of Italy. Throughout his years as Duke of Savoy and Prince of Piedmont, Victor Emmanuel was rather passive in contrast to his political counterparts. However, his relationship with both of the aforementioned politicians was crucial in deciding the outcome of Risorgimento. When Garibaldi wanted to continue his progress up the mainland peninsula, Victor Emmanuel and Cavour met his expedition at Teano where Sicily, Naples and all encompassing territory was handed over in 1859. This meeting was another important legal agreement that repressed all chances of a republican revolution and favoured a slower process of annexation under Piedmont. Given that the meeting involved solely three men, the Italian masses were deliberately excluded from such an important decision. Stability across Italy was yet again completely absent.
Free, and nearly entirely united, the opinion of civilised nations is favourable to us; the just and liberal principles, now prevailing in the councils of Europe, are favourable to us. Italy herself, too, will become a guarantee of order and peace, and will once more be an efficacious instrument of universal civilization. . . .These facts have inspired the nation with great confidence in its own destinies. I take pleasure in manifesting to the first Parliament of Italy the joy I feel in my heart as king and soldier.
The excerpt above is from a landmark moment in Italian history - the first speech made by a king who rules over a nation not solely singular provinces. Even Victor Emmanuel, within his first line, has to ironically admit that the Kingdom of Italy was geographically ‘nearly entirely united’. In 1861, both Venezia and Rome remained occupied by foreign nations.
When mentioning the wider European community, Victor Emmanuel incorrectly states that ‘the opinion of civilised nations is favourable to us’. Addressing the statement literally, many European nations were sceptical of the way Italy had unconvincingly united their territories. Cavour’s plebiscites were scrutinised by some as a rigged process that appeared an illusion of democracy. In the case of Catholic France, the state of Italy was not recognised for more than a decade given the Papacy residence in Rome. For the nations that did accept the terms agreed by Victor Emmanuel and Cavour, the process was not wary of Italian interest but rather their own benefits. For example, liberal Belgian politicians recognised the Kingdom of Italy as a move to directly oppose Catholic loyalists within the country. There was also an economic benefit for Belgium as they were able to monopolise the trading opportunities with an inexperienced Italy.
Across history, to ‘guarantee order and peace’ is certainly a brave and optimistic statement for any leader to make. The guarantee made by Victor Emmanuel certainly did not come to fruition in the following years. Internally, Italy suffered a social crisis with Southern famine and neglect resulting in the Brigands War which saw the predominantly Northern Italian army deployed to slaughter its own people. This speech coincided with the legal assumption that a united Italy, eliminating foreign occupation, would thrive on its own accord. As the constitution was headed by a historically submissive Victor Emmanuel, continuing social disorder between class, rank, North and South questions whether a unification imposed by Piedmont was the correct choice in the long term.
Conclusions
A social history from below (Thompsonian school) importantly challenges traditionalist historiography surrounding the Risorgimento. As a large abundance of the Italian population were either illiterate or communicated in local dialects difficult to currently translate, both surviving social and legal sources are limited to an elite minority. Reading these sources against the grain is an attempt to grant the ordinary Italian human agency which in turn reveals the complex nature of a supposed ‘unity’.
The legal documents, such as electoral plebiscites and treaties regarding the annexation of lands, were used to justify the authenticity of the unification process, however this was far from reality. Within the speeches of three pivotal figures themselves are completely different perceptions of a united Italy. Garibaldi favours a revolutionary seizure of power from below whilst Cavour would rather an Italy nurtured by the Northern territory of Piedmont. However, both strongly agree that the Risorgimento was a selective process and not an inclusive one. There would be winners and losers either way with present day Italy still experiencing a noticeable North-South divide.
Ash Fowkes-Gajan
Bibliography from the Peak Event Presentation:
Dario Musolino, 'The North-South Divide in Italy: Reality or Perception?', European Spatial Research and Policy, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Sciendo, 2018), pp. 29-53.
Frederik Dhondt, 'Legal arguments in the debate on recognition of Italian independence in Belgian parliament (November 1861)', Forum Historiae Iuris (2022), pp. 1-31.
John Dickie, A Word at War: The Italian Army and Brigandage 1860-1870, History Workshop, Vol. 33 (Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 1-24.
Mark Dincecco, Giovanni Federico and Andrea Vindigni, 'Warfare, Taxation, and Political Change: Evidence from the Italian Risorgimento', The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 887-914.
Sergio Marchisio, ‘Chapter 12: The Unification of Italy and International Law’ in A History of International Law in Italy (Oxford Academic, 2020), pp. 285-309.
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